Weber Thompson - Lessons Not Learned

Lessons not learned: Life Safety issues from The Cocoanut Grove to The Station . . .

as published in NEWH Magazine
August 2003

In Boston's Cocoanut Grove 492 people lost their lives and 166 people were injured when a fire ripped through the club. The flames and noxious smoke spread so swiftly throughout the building that some victims collapsed at their tables. Most panicking patrons ran to the only exit they knew, the main revolving door. This was knocked off its axis and jammed, causing over 200 victims to pile up behind it. Other patrons fled to doors that opened inward, were locked or, in one instance, was welded shut to "prevent patrons from skipping out on tabs". Many believe that the lighting failed as well, plunging the club into darkness, causing patrons to succumb to the thick smoke when they tried to traverse the club in the dark hampered by hundreds of tables and chairs, unable to find emergency exits in the "rabbit warren" of rooms and corridors.

Sound familiar? The Cocoanut Grove fire occurred in 1942, however many of the situations that caused that tragedy were present in the more recent fatal nightclub incident at Rhode Island's The Station, currently the fourth most deadly nightclub fire in U.S. history. This and other incidents (namely Chicago’s E2) focused the nation's attention on nightclub and bar safety and galvanized designers, owners and officials to carefully scrutinize current codes, building standards and operating procedures. Organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), as well as other industry and government groups across the country have been convening to discuss the following issues to prevent further disasters.

Occupancy and Exiting Requirements

Exceeding allowed occupant loads, insufficient or non-code complying exits or poorly delineated exit paths have been directly cited as contributing factors in at least three of the five most deadly nightclub fires in the United States (see sidebar). For example, in the Cocoanut Grove fire the occupancy limit of the club exceeded safe occupant load maximums by over 400 people.

Occupant load determines the minimum number and width of required exits based on calculations of the type of assembly occupancy – buildings, structures or portions of each with an occupancy of 50 or more persons. The guidelines, developed by the NFPA and used by fire officials as a basis for their inspection programs, state, "exiting is the most critical of all requirements for any assembly occupancy." Providing easily identifiable exit paths – spaced so fires or collapsing structures do not easily block all exits – is critical in designing a safe facility. In general terms assembly occupancies are required to have a minimum of at least two exits with the main entrance/exit able to accommodate at least half of the occupant load. All exit doors must, "swing in the direction of the path of travel," and must be equipped with panic hardware. These doors and the paths of travel to them must have directional and exit signage identifying the location and path to each door. In addition, emergency lighting, with an independent power source – in case of building power failure – and sufficient intensity to clearly light the route of travel to each exit is required. Without these necessary precautions, there is a higher probability of more tragedies like the one in Rhode Island.

Fire Protection and Smoke Control Systems

Fire protection systems – onsite or built-in equipment including portable fire extinguishers, interior standpipes and hose lines, automatic sprinkler systems and fire alarms – have become one of the first lines of defense against the loss of life. All assembly occupancies, no matter the size, are required by current fire codes to provide portable fire extinguishers and both visual and audible alarm systems. Most regulating codes require all new construction of assembly occupancies exceeding 300 occupants or any facility serving alcoholic beverages to have full sprinkler systems installed. However, as with The Station, many current bar and nightclub facilities are not required to install sprinkler systems because of their small size and age. Many facilities built before 1974 were grandfathered in under the new codes and are exempt from the sprinkler requirements. Since The Station fire however, there has been a push by the public and officials to require sprinkler systems and monitoring by local fire departments in all nightclubs and dance halls, regardless of when they were built. Although there is considerable proof that sprinklers significantly reduce the loss of life, the proposals, which could cost millions, is gaining opposition. The argument is that enacting and enforcing such regulations would put the brunt of the financial weight on the small, established club owners. Finding the funds to retrofit their facilities, while many are already struggling in the current economy, is a significant issue that is being weighed against the possibility of more lives lost.

Interior Finishes and Furnishings

In each of the five deadliest nightclub fires (see sidebar), interior decoration, construction and finishes were cited for the speed the fires spread as well as the noxious smoke that choked the clubs. In The Station incident fire officials believe that the stage's sound-dampening tiles, suspected of being made of untreated polyurethane foam, could have accelerated the speed of the fire's spread. "It basically burns like gasoline," said Donald Bliss, president of the National Fire Marshals Association and fire marshal for the state of New Hampshire. "When it burns, it melts and spreads the fire and will ignite anything it touches." In the Cocoanut Grove fire, it is believed that the fire started when an artificial cocoanut palm was ignited. The NFPA report states, "The interior, with its low ceilings, combustible wall and ceiling finish and flammable decorations was actually a death trap, but the building structure itself was 'fire proof'."

Today, codes require that all interior finish materials be fire-tested to evaluate their flame spread and smoke development. If walls or ceilings are required to have any fire-resistive or noncombustible construction, then the finish materials must be applied directly to the fire assembly, on furring stripes not exceeding 2 inches in depth, and all voids must be filled with fire-resistant materials to prevent the fire from spreading in concealed spaces. In addition, all interior decorations are required to be treated with flame-retardants.

Even with these standards, most of which have been in effect even before the 1942 Cocoanut Grove fire, the task of enforcing them is often difficult. From a practical standpoint flame-spread ratings and the effectiveness of flame-retardant treatments are hard to ascertain on existing construction during official field inspections. If markings signifying flame-retardant materials are not readily visible, inspectors must rely on the owner to provide that information that the owner may not have or is unable to obtain. Additionally, the effectiveness of flame-retardants, which are susceptible to water and can be washed out or diluted in areas with high humidity, is impossible to predict. Reportedly, in the Cocoanut Grove fire, the inspectors tested the flammability of the decorations by exposing them to flame shortly before the fire. While the flame retardant was able to withstand the small flame, it is believed that the heat of the fire, once ignited, easily overcame any of the retardants' effectiveness. Most fire prevention standards recommend that decorations be limited and kept away from any possible contact with ignition sources including items such as candles, flaming dishes and electrical outlets.

Club Expense vs. Liability

Owners and designers need to carefully weigh the lost revenue due to a lower seat count and the higher cost of finish materials with a lower flame spread rating and the installation of sprinkler systems against the liability consequences of a tragedy. Since the Cocoanut Grove fire, prosecutors have brought criminal charges against landlords and club owners when fatalities occurred in facilities that violated building and safety codes. Of the 10 people indicted and arrested for the Cocoanut Grove tragedy only two were sentenced and of those only Barnet Welansky, principal owner, received significant jail time ( 12-15 years ). In recent years mass torts against finish product suppliers and civil wrongful death suits have joined the breadth of what owners face in these tragedies.

The recent tragedies have spotlighted bar and nightclub safety issues through their continuous presence in the press and the deaths they propagated. Although the use of pyrotechnics, the issues of panic and crowd control and questions regarding the lack of enforcement of codes are major contributors to many bar and nightclub fires, the consensus is that if basic standards detailed above for exiting, fire control systems and finishes had been followed, many of the deaths could have been avoided.

For more information about the disasters and fires cited in this article as well as fire regulations and crisis management, visit the NFPA's website at www.nfpa.org or call your local building safety and fire departments. Remember, specific code requirements are jurisdictional and based on current federal, state and local building codes.

Since 1989, Jillene Cochran has designed projects ranging from institutional facilities to multi-family, but her heart has always been with her hospitality projects. A graduate from the University of Washington, Ms. Cochran designed restaurants up and down the west coast from Palomino's in La Jolla44 California to the Puget Sound's new, celebrated seafood restaurant, Seastar Restaurant and Raw Bar. Ms. Cochran is a Project Manager at Seattle multi-disciplinary architecture firm Weber + Thompson, www.weberthompson.com, where she leads the hospitality design team.

Side Bar:
5 deadliest nightclub fires in U.S. history

Cocoanut Grove nightclub, Boston, MA
November 28, 1942, 492 killed
Rhythm Club dance hall, Natzhex, MS
April 23, 1940, 207 killed
Beverly Hills Supper Club, Southgate, KY
May 21, 1977, 165 killed
The Station nightclub, West Warwick, RI
February 20, 2003, 99 killed
Happy Land social club, Bronx, NY
March 25, 1990, 87 killed